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Abstract
Le concept de "Gamification" se fonde sur l'idée que l'on peut facilement
distinguer "un jeu" d'un "non-jeu", et qu'il serait temps que le "non-jeu" prenne
en considération ce qui fonctionne avec le "jeu" (McGonigal 2011). Pour Jacques
Henriot, qualifier un objet de "jeu" est arbitraire, puisque "Ce que l'on entend
aujourd'hui par jeu, dans la société qui est la mienne, avait peut-être un contenu
différent dans cette même société au cours des siècles passés, a peut-être une
autre signification dans des groupes sociaux différents à l'époque où je vis et sera
peut-être incompris des siècles futurs. Car les choses changent. Leur variation
est à estimer en fonction de deux coordonnées : le temps et l'espace." (Henriot
1989, 15). Cet article met en contraste la pensée formelle auréolant les préceptes
de la "Gamification" avec la pensée philosophique du "jouer" proposée par
Jacques Henriot. A travers cela, nous questionnons les fondements mêmes de
la Gamification.
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Gamification principles are based on the following idea: There is the game, 
and there is the non-game. We find it is time for the non-game to take into 
consideration what works in the game (McGonigal 2011a). The aim of the 
present article is to question this seemingly clear distinction and to show 
the limits and the contingence of this premise. Jacques Henriot is the author 
who inspired this article. He is a well-known philosopher in France where he 
founded the Sciences du jeu1 research laboratory 30 years ago. Unfortunately, 
his work is almost unknown to the Anglo-Saxon academic world, which 
partially stems from the fact that his texts have not been translated. For Hen-
riot, the qualification of an object as a game is arbitrary, since “the thing that 
I call game right now in the world where I live, was different yesterday, may 
be different tomorrow. It is probably different elsewhere” (Henriot 1989, 
1 The term “jeu” in French refers to both English words “game” and “play”. This linguistic 
feature probably has some cognitive consequences, as we shall see.
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15).2 Nevertheless, as he highlights, we must resist a double temptation: on 
the one hand, considering the game to have no intrinsic reality, something 
he pointed out with some developmental psychologists; on the other hand, 
considering the game to be overtaking all parts of our culture (Henriot 1969, 
6–15). This means if games have an intrinsic reality, it is perhaps not where 
it is believed to be.
a cRiticiSm aBout the game of gamification
“I love playing games.” If you identify with this, you probably do too, or at 
least the subject interests you. But when I say “I love playing games” and you 
think, “Yes (or no), I (do not) love playing games”, are we sure we are talking 
about the same thing? Maybe I am thinking of strategy games I have played 
and you are thinking of puzzles or action games. Our idea of games is prob-
ably different. Thus the question is: What makes a game a game?
The concept of game in gamification is influenced by video games and 
the success of this industry. The proponents of gamification are mainly in-
terested in a macro-gameplay design principle: the objective-challenge-re-
ward loop (Albinet and Mousson 2010). According to this principle, the 
game’s progression is based on causal relations: a task to accomplish, reward, 
or failure. The design thus consists of developing a system for reward or 
punishment in the game (e.g. with badges). Behind terms like “onboard-
ing”, “scaffolding”, “pathways to mastery” (Coursera 2013), the proponents 
of gamification infer that a behaviourist stimulus-response-reinforcement 
process will naturally motivate the player to play. According to one propo-
nent, Gabe Zichermann, this classic game design principle, which can be 
found in casual games (“average-challenges” games as he calls them), uses 
what he calls the “dopamine release loop”, which is what occurs in our brains 
when an achievable challenge ends in success (rewarded success, of course) 
(Zichermann and Linder 2013, 132). 
The principle in a reward system, which is only one among others in 
game design, does not make up the basis of every game. For example, the 
first video game in history Spacewar! (1962) had three game objects: two 
missile-armed spaceships and a main star with a gravity well. There was no 
2 Henriot’s emphasis. All qotations from Jaques Henriot are my translations. 
189
scoring system; two players simply tried to destroy each other’s spaceship 
and avoid crashing into the star. How can we consider this a game since it 
only has a few rewarding elements? Why is it regarded to be the first video 
game in history, when examples like Tennis for Two (1958) or Mouse in the 
Maze (1959) could also claim this status? Game designer Sébastien Genvo 
gives us an explanation, stating that it was the first video game in history 
because it was the first game developed as such; the others being software 
developed with the intention of creating a game (Genvo 2009, 28). 
Jane McGonigal, who is credited with being the instigator of gamifi-
cation with her book Reality is Broken (2011a), has recently reacted to the 
gamification buzz during the Game Developers Conference in a presenta-
tion titled “How to Re-Invent Reality without Gamification” (2011b). She 
admits, like Sebastian Deterding (2010), that points, leaderboards, and chal-
lenges do not make a game. She talks about what does make a game – what 
she calls “gameful design” –, which means “creating the spirit of the gamer”. 
In her keynote talk, while criticising gamification, Jane McGonigal main-
tains an important idea from her book: There are games and there are non-
games, and those who design games can help to improve the non-games. As 
emphasised by the psychologist Yann Leroux, this is a pleasant discourse in 
front of a game designers’ audience (2011). 
Some researchers challenge the separation between game and non-
game, considering the game to be an experience rather than a clear system of 
objects. The game designer Sébastien Genvo uses the term “ludicisation” in-
stead of “ludification” (Genvo 2013) to translate “gamification” into French, 
just as Ian Bogost criticised the rhetorical “-ify” in the term “gamification” 
(Bogost 2011), Genvo explains that:
It is necessary not to maintain inherently playful characteristics and the 
dimensions of an object, but rather to question how some objects, which 
were not even considered to be games, gradually started to be designated 
as such, and how, in doing so, the idea we had of what a game is will 
change. (Genvo 2013)3  
3  Translation by the author.
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 Haydée Silva Ochoa points out that gamification is a hybrid word with 
an English-prefix and a French-suffix, -fication, coming from the Latin fac-
ere, which means “to do / to make”. The problem is that it “reinforces the idea 
of an automatic rather than a problematic transformation of an activity usu-
ally excluded from the ludic sphere” (Silva Ochoa 2013).4 These criticisms 
draw on the fact that somehow our “language filter” guides our conceptions 
of things. In English, the distinction between game and play seems to imply 
that the question should be addressed separately – from the perspective of 
objects and systems of rules (game) or from the other of the activities of play-
ers (play). In French, this distinction does not exist: The free-activity of play 
or the rule-based game are both found in the same word jeu. Unlike other 
languages, it seems that the distinction is amplified, so the Nordic can “play a 
play” or “game a game”5 (Juul 2011, 28–29). This linguistic fact is not neutral. 
Language, as explained by the semio-pragmatic, is both a way of represent-
ing the world, like other symbolic forms, and a 
way of understanding and interacting with it. 
By insisting on one aim rather than on another, 
we reveal how we understand a phenomenon. 
In this sense, the neologism “gamification” is 
very clear, and could be translated literally as 
“make it look like a game”. But behind that, 
there is the idea of making an object (website, 
app, software, or even “reality”) look like another (video game). This obvi-
ously infers that: 1. games and non-games are clearly identifiable, 2. it is pos-
sible to transpose a game to a non-game, and 3. the associated conduct, play, 
will occur, and with it all its positive effects such as engagement, motivation, 
fun, etc. Play is then reduced to “responding to a game”. But playing is more 
than that, as Jacques Henriot explains. 
4 Translation by the author.
5 In gamification, speaking of “gaming a game” means that players may start cheating the 
rules of the game that they are supposed to follow. It is considered a gamification risk, or 
more precisely a risk for the player (in the examples taken) because not following the rules 
may create a dangerous situation. (Werbach and Hunter 2012, 117–119). For Henriot (see 
below), it is actually the climax of play, when you play at the extreme limit of the game 
(Henriot 1989, 92).
The essence of the game  
does not lie in 
the system of objects, but 
in the relationship that 
develops between 
the player and the game.
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the theoRy of Playing By JacqueS henRiot
In 1969, Jacques Henriot established the foundation for his way of thinking 
based upon the interwoven themes of obligation, responsibility, and what he 
calls, the “voluntary condition” in a book simply entitled Le jeu. In this book, 
Henriot explains that: “Le jeu is not in the thing, but in the use made of it” 
(Henriot 1969, 24).6 The syntactic definitions of play proposed by authors 
like Johan Huizinga (2008 / 1938) and Roger Caillois (1992 / 1958) are some-
what unsatisfactory, because they do not allow us to enter the “pensée du jeu” 
or play thinking. For the philosopher, each element proposed in these defi-
nitions can be questioned: a “free” activity? Work is equally free, at least in 
terms of a certain freedom of means – thus, a separate activity? But if sepa-
ration means “boundary”, there are ad minima two territories around it, and 
the other is then also separated – so an “unproductive” activity? When the 
game produces nothing outside itself; however, to some extent, the player is 
the result of her or his game – an activity with a “set of rules” then? What be-
haviour does not follow rules? In that case, a “fictitious” activity? The game 
can be fake, but it is operational not fictional, it really exists (Henriot 1969, 
56–64). Jacques Henriot therefore advocates a pragmatic approach to games:
A game can probably be defined objectively by the set of rules that give it 
its structure. That allows it to be compared to other games. But in doing 
so, we fail to specify how one game and another are both games. It is im-
plicitly assumed that any definition of a game begins with the proclama-
tion of its playful nature [. . .]. We describe the structure, we list the rules, 
but we do not say what makes it a game. (Ibid., 41)
He goes on to argue that the things called games refer to the analysis of play-
ing, which is their principle: 
Any game [. . .] exists if someone invents and reinvents it as such – for 
playing, for being played – and if it offers itself to the praxis of someone 




For him, the essence of the game does not lie for him in the system of ob-
jects but in the relationship that develops between the player and the game, 
explained above with the example of Spacewar! (1962). In this text, Jacques 
Henriot identifies four criteria characterising the relationship between the 
player and the game she or he plays (ibid., 73–80):
•	 Distance: Playing the game remains subjective, no one is ever sure of its 
reality, not even the player who knows he or she is playing.
•	 Uncertainty: There is still unpredictability – real or perceived – between 
the actions and the consequences.
•	 Duplicity: The player sees her- or himself in a state of “playing” with the 
assurance that it is just a game.
•	 Illusion: Entering the game assumes a prior understanding of what the 
game is. “A playful attitude, like any attitude, is taken” (ibid., 77).
In 1989, according to several published articles (Henriot 2013), Henriot 
draws a form of synthesis of his reflection: Sous Couleur de Jouer (Henriot 
1989). As part of an interview with Haymée Silva Ochoa for her PhD (2011), 
Henriot explains the title of his book:
It is [in The Savage Mind by Levi-Strauss] that I found the phrase Sous 
couleur de jouer. Sous couleur de jouer8 means in reality that we do not 
play. Basically, we could say that “play” is “the belief that we play”. And 
to believe, it would mean that we bring, in the interpretation we place on 
behaviour, contents of ideas, ideas that I willingly call metaphysical, be-
cause they exceed experience [. . .]. For example, we believe it is possible to 
introduce into things unpredictability, unexpectability, contingency. And 
above all, and there is the big word, “freedom”! The player feels free, but is 
he really? (Brougère 2013)9
 
According to Henriot, there could be a kind of “double illusion” in the act 
of playing. The first, symbolic or semantic, is due to the status given to the 
game. It can be called: “the game illusion”. 
8 Wearing the colours of a player, i.e. having a player mentality.
9 Translation by the author.
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To play, you must enter the game. To enter the game, you must know that 
it is a game. There is therefore, from the one who gets to play, a first un-
derstanding of the meaning of game. (Henriot 1969, 77)
A game in this sense is primarily an idea (Henriot 1989, 15–16). This idea is 
globally and culturally shared between the people who design the game and 
the people who accept to play it. Issues of computer-mediated interactions 
often obscure the role of the cultural conception of the game. Playing video 
games is seen as a kind of interaction between an object and a user. But the 
video game is foremost something designed as a game, and then it could be 
seen as a shared idea of playing. In other words, video game designers try, 
via computer-interactivity, to transmit an idea of how to play this game and 
players try to understand and in a way accept this idea as a game to be en-
gaged in. It is a kind of co-design, as J.P. Gee pointed out (2005). Once this 
idea is accepted, as described by Caillois, then comes the conduct associated 
therewith, to conform to the game’s forms and the associated illusion (“the 
play illusion”). If the first step, for Henriot, is necessary for the second, both 
are ontologically related:
[. . .] I do not think that the two English words game and play refer to 
two different types, one with rules, and the other without. Rather, they 
characterise two different aspects, but complementary ones, of any act of 
playing. There is no playing without a requirement of rationality, without 
an obligation that we ourselves impose, without respecting some kind of 
rule; there is no game if the structure remains empty and purely formal, if 
it is not referred to as an instrument of possible play.
(Henriot 1989, 107–10)
Jacques Henriot explains that a game is actually the representation of a kind 
of conduct in relation to a situation’s shape (ibid., 216). To be played, the 
situation should allow for it, and the subject in the situation should have the 
capacity to perceive and imagine the situation as a game. “Taken separately, 
neither the situation nor the mental attitude is enough to make it a game” 
(ibid.). Jacques Henriot uses the concept of “jouabilité” to describe a situa-
tion conducive to play. “I propose to theorise as ‘jouabilité’ that which, on a 
purely structural level, makes a potential game out of a situation.” (ibid., 217). 
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The French term jouabilité could be translated as “playability” in English. 
Playability, as user experience, generally refers to methods used to assess 
the quality of a game’s design (Bernhaupt, Eckschlager and Tscheligi 2007, 
Nacke et al. 2009). As Regina Bernhaupt noted: “Terms like fun, flow and 
playability are most often used to explain user experience in game design” 
(Bernhaupt, Eckschlager and Tscheligi 2007, 309). In practice, the concept 
is difficult to pin down:
[. . .] more research is needed to create a coherent set of playability heu-
ristics that can be used to evaluate all kinds of digital games in all kinds of 
different settings and environments [. . .]. (Nacke et al. 2009, 2) 
In this sense, the purpose of the playability approach is to determine a ma-
trix of indicators that can be applied to video game products to help assess 
the quality of the play experience each one offers. This approach is interest-
ing for comparing products between each other. But these approaches fail, at 
one level, to say in which way it is a “playable experience” and in which way 
it is not. They do not allow us to determine why situations are suitable or not 
to be played, and furthermore why situations, which were not considered 
playable, are now considered, at least semantically, to fall within the game 
family.
Gonzalez Sanchez and colleagues consider playability to be “the degree 
to which specified users can achieve specified goals with effectiveness, 
efficiency and especially satisfaction and fun [. . .]” (2012, 1038). They do 
conceptual work around identified relational forms (and not purely consti-
tutive) in the study of a corpus of video games. It shows that there are differ-
ent facets of playability (ibid., 1042):
•	 Intrinsic: playability of the game’s design (mechanisms, rules, etc.)
•	 Mechanical: playability of the software (communication system, flu-
ency, etc.)
•	 Interactive: playability of the user interface (controls, dialogues, etc.)
•	 Artistic: the aesthetic playability (visual graphics, music, storylines, etc.)
•	 Intrapersonal: the subjective outlook produced by the video game in 
each player
•	 Interpersonal: the group awareness that arises when playing the game
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Even with this differentiation, we maintain an approach that seeks to iden-
tify indicators to assess the quality of objects; although, Sanchez and col-
leagues do point out that video games are games, of course, and software 
(“good games can be bad software or vice versa”), and communication tools, 
and artistic works, but their results especially demonstrate that variability 
comes from the subjective and facets related to shared experience (ibid., 
1049). However, based on the framework outlined here following Henriot, 
the jouabilité of a game, what Jesper Juul describes as the “pull” or desire to 
play the game (Juul 2010, 2–5), must be considered on a different level, and 
the game objects and mechanisms highlighted by the proponents of gami-
fication are just one of those levels. A situation becomes playable when the 
situation inspires the game to “come to mind”. The idea of the game seems 
to come from both intrinsic object characteristics (rules, interface, graph-
ics, etc.) and the player’s previous personal experience. As Juul noted in his 
study on casual gamers (ibid., 127), there are several “frames” to consider 
regarding the playability of a game: the first is related to the game as an 
object (“the goal orientation and the desire to win”), the following is related 
to previous experience (“the game as an experience and the desire to partic-
ipate in an interesting game”), and finally there are the relationships allowed 
by the game (“the game as a social event and the desire to manage social 
situations”). As Alain and Frédéric Le Diberder say: “Video games are not a 
solitary practice that is occasionally shared. It is rather a common practice 
often played alone” (1998, 171).10
Following Jacques Henriot, when a game is identified as playable, a spe-
cific conduct must be adopted.11 He calls this conduct le jouer. What char-
acterises this conduct is that it is based on both obligation and uncertainty 
(Henriot 1989, 114–115). The obligation does not come from the structure 
of the game, but from the obligation that is imposed on the player as she or 
he agrees to play the game. The obligation is not only placed upon the goal, 
but also upon the means to achieve it (ibid., 235). He calls the obligation 
an “arbitrary theme” in the sense that it is an individual decision and not a 
10 Translation by the author.
11 Henriot prefers the term “conduct” to “behaviour”, as it refers to a voluntary act and not a 
conditioned one.
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transcendent order, even when rules are given by a system, since these rules 
are only mandatory for the person who wants to play during the time period 
she or he plays (ibid., 229). 
If the essence of any game lies its completion, the path to accomplish-
ment is paved with uncertainty. For Henriot, this uncertainty may be due 
to different things: the lack of information available to the player, her or 
his intellectual faculties or position within the situation (ibid., 237). This 
uncertainty is then subjective and irreducible. In this context of uncertainty, 
playing is decision-making unaided by rigorous logical deduction. “Playing 
is always deciding under uncertainty” (ibid., 239).12 He calls this arrangement 
of means under uncertainty “random patterns” in the sense that players 
do not often have the resources needed to achieve their project and must 
“tinker” to do so (ibid., 236).
At least, playing a game for Jacques Henriot is the relationship estab-
lished between the appropriate object and the playful conduct. The founda-
tion of this relationship can be expressed as a metaphor: 
The player lives on two levels. He does what he does and at the same time 
he plays. He plays in doing what he does. His playing is due to the distance 
he puts and tries to maintain between what he does and what he does 
when he is doing. (Ibid., 256)
The metaphor is related to both the game and the play illusion, in the sense 
that the situation is first interpreted as a game, which is itself the result of 
a metaphorical process. It is a shift in meaning or a second-degree activity: 
“what characterizes the game is a diversion, a transformation of denotation” 
(Brougère 2005, 44).
In summary, Jacques Henriot considers that to be taken as a game, a situ-
ation must exhibit some characteristics that make it identifiable. But at the 
same time, none of those characteristics, taken separately or together, are 
sufficient to make it a game without any mediation. The “idea of game” must 
come to someone, and this can only happen, in fact, if the person is able to 
transcend the situation but also to identify the conduct he adopts (playing) 
12  Henriot’s emphasis.
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as relative to the game. In other words, it is necessary for the person to ar-
rive at the idea that she or he is actually “playing a game” (Henriot 1989, 
292–295). 
the fallacieS of gamification 
The serious games designer Olivier Mauco sees a triple fallacy in gamification: 
1. The digitisation fallacy: There are no new objects or practices, but rather 
the adoption of other marketing practices like loyalty coupons: “It is 
only a change of medium.”
2. The behaviourist fallacy: Studies in media sociology show that the im-
portance of local cultural practices and devices do not condition indi-
viduals because they belong to a social space.
3. The aesthetic fallacy: Gamification adopts the arcade persona but only 
at a visual level. From the ludic side, game is mostly a competition be-
tween a player and a system (Mauco 2012, 9–12).
For Mauco, the use of gamification as a marketing technique must be inter-
preted in the context of the “attention economy”. In a society over-saturated 
with information, the problem is not the information, but the attention of 
the public. As he says: “Gamification is the rationalization of the attention’s 
problem by the use of behavioral techniques.” (ibid.).13 
Nevertheless, the first fallacy of gamification is simply the game fallacy. 
A game structure, as good as it may be, is not enough to make a game. As 
Jacques Henriot says, if a “playable” structure is necessary, the game only 
exists if the idea of game comes to someone’s mind. A game is a game first 
because someone has been able to communicate it through a system of ob-
jects and rules; but second because this structure becomes a game for some-
one else through the evolution of its understanding, appropriation, maybe 
diversions, and surely the sharing of this idea. In brief, when it is played. 
“Think like a game designer” (Coursera 2013) is the slogan of gamifi-
cation’s proponents. Jacques Henriot might say, “No! Think like a player”. 
When we think like a player, we think of game situations that were exciting 
and others that we did not like even though people said they were great 
games. We think about games that occupied us for hours and then we passed 
13 Translation by the author.
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on to others. We think of tips and tricks that allowed us to circumvent a step 
that we regarded as boring or for which we did not want to spend the extra 
hours. And mostly, we think of times when we did not want to play at all. So 
long as it merely represents a set of proven techniques, gamification will still 
not guarantee that people will play the game (or the game you think they 
must play) or that the success will immediately come from the situation. You 
can dream of Foursquare (2009), World of Warcraft (2004) or Candy Crush 
(2012) successes, but they are probably more cultural than technical. You 
can mimic their structures without having the same success. We certainly 
cannot determine when it’s game on… and when it’s game over.
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